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INTRODUCTION
In this paper we examine religiosity as one determinant of corporate and individual tax avoidance.
At this time, our understanding of why some firms and individuals avoid taxes more than others is less than complete (Shevlin 2007) . With respect to firms, prior research suggests that tax avoidance in influenced by corporate attributes such as profitability, intangible assets, R&D spending, the extent of foreign operations, leverage and aggressiveness in financial reporting (e.g., Frank et al. 2009; Graham and Tucker 2006; Gupta and Newberry 1997; Rego 2003; Wilson 2009 ). However, Dyreng et al. (2010a) suggest that individual managers have an influence on a firm's tax aggressiveness that is incremental to firm characteristics. Because tax avoidance is risky, it can impose costs on managers as well as their employers. Given that religiosity is associated with risk aversion (Hilary and Hui 2009; Miller and Hoffman 1995; Osoba 2003) , we argue that religiosity can influence managers to undertake less aggressive (i.e., risky) tax positions, and thus account for some of the variation in tax avoidance across firms. 1 Specifically, we hypothesize that higher levels of religious affiliation in the population in the county of a firm's corporate headquarters (or an individual taxpayer's domicile) is associated with lower tax avoidance. The extant literature offers two related perspectives on religiosity that motivate our inquiry. The first perspective focuses on risk aversion and the role of religion in lowering risk taking.
Specifically, prior research suggests that religiosity is positively correlated with the individual's aversion to risk, i.e., more anxious individuals are more likely to seek comfort through participation in religion (Malinowski 1925; Gaspar and Clore 1998; Miller and Hoffman 1995) . Recent survey evidence also suggests a negative association between religious attendance and measures of risk-taking such as living in unsafe or unsecure localities or trying new/different things in life (Hilary and Hui 2009) . Although the 3 benefits of tax avoidance are straightforward (i.e., increased cash flow), tax aggressiveness can also impose substantial costs in the form of time devoted to tax planning and resolving IRS audits. Further, if the IRS is successful in challenging an aggressive tax position, the costs can be materially higher in terms of interest charges, legal penalties, and reputation loss if the aggressive tax avoidance becomes publicly known (e.g., Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Wilson 2009 ). Consequently, consistent with risk aversion (i.e., to avoid the risk of being audited and exposed to these penalties and losses), religiosity can be expected to be associated with lower tax avoidance for both corporate and individual taxpayers.
The second perspective on religiosity emphasizes the role of religion as a social mechanism for influencing behavior in economic and social interactions (Kennedy and Lawton 1998; North 1991; Stulz and Williamson 2003) . Religion-based social norms potentially are a powerful behavioral influence because they encompass a wider menu of rewards and sanctions, i.e., religion may be viewed as a sanctioning system that inhibits unethical or opportunistic behavior. Further, violation of religion-based social norms may induce negative feelings in the individual which, in turn, may result in a tarnished selfimage that could impair the social functioning of the individual. Potentially, the negative feelings associated with violating religion-based social norms may serve as a stronger deterrent than the perceived threat of legal sanctions (Grasmick and Bursick 1990) .
Consistent with the notion that a religion-based social identity and sense of belonging affects individual behavior, recent empirical research in accounting and finance suggests that local religious beliefs impact a wide range of corporate decisions including financial reporting irregularities and accruals-based earnings manipulation (Dyreng et al. 2012 , McGuire et al. 2012 , overgenerous executive compensation (Grullon et al. 2010) , and risk exposure (Hilary and Hui 2009) . Broadly speaking, the literature suggests that the behavior of individuals (including that of corporate senior executives) is shaped by the religious beliefs of the community in which the individual (firm) is domiciled (headquartered). In other words, local religious values cannot be separated from business life, i.e., individuals (whether they themselves are personally religious or not) are influenced by the religion-based social norms of the local community in which they work and reside. Thus, prior research suggests that 4 local religion-based social norms contribute to an individual's ethical behavior, and by extension, corporate behavior in terms of limiting opportunism in economic interactions (e.g., McGuire et al. 2012 ).
Altogether, for reasons related to both perspectives, i.e., religiosity-related risk aversion as well as violation of religion-based social norms, we predict a negative relation between religiosity in the community (county) and tax avoidance by corporate and individual taxpayers.
To test our prediction, we analyze corporate and individual taxpayer data separately. We gauge corporate tax avoidance by utilizing a firm's cash effective tax rates, tax shelter prediction scores, and estimated amount of unrecognized tax benefits. To capture the extent of tax avoidance by individual taxpayers, we estimate the fraction of income omitted from individual tax returns filed within the county by comparing the aggregate county-wide adjusted gross income (per the Internal Revenue Service) with the aggregate county-wide household income (per the U.S. Census Bureau annual American Community Services survey). Consistent with prior research (e.g., Hilary and Hui 2009), we measure religiosity based on the extent of religious affiliation in the county in which a firm is headquartered or an individual taxpayer is domiciled. Specifically, we measure religiosity as the fraction of the U.S. county-wide population that claims affiliation with an organized religion as reported by the American Religions Data Archive's (ARDA) religious congregations and membership studies. In addition, we decompose the religiosity measure by examining Protestant and Catholic adherence. 2 For the corporate analysis, our sample consists of over 33,000 firm-years (4,670 firms) over a 19-year period (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) . For the analysis of individual taxpayers, our sample covers 3,700 county-years spanning the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . Our results indicate that religiosity is consistently associated with lower tax avoidance by corporations as well as individual taxpayers. In terms of economic significance, we find that an increase in county-level religiosity by one standard deviation increases corporate effective tax rates by 0.48 percentage points and reduces individual tax avoidance at the aggregate county level by 0.89 2 Hilary and Hui (2009) suggest that decomposing the religiosity metric into Catholic and Protestant components helps eliminate the possibility of correlated omitted variables because Catholic and Protestant religious adherence are negatively correlated, creating a situation where an omitted variable would need to be correlated in opposite directions with the two religion variables, and also correlated with the dependent variable. 5 percentage points. These results hold after controlling for several firm-level as well as county-level demographic characteristics identified in prior research as affecting tax avoidance by corporate and/or individual taxpayers.
Our study makes two contributions to the literature. First, to date, empirical tax research has focused primarily on the role of firm characteristics in tax avoidance (for reviews, see Shackelford and Shevlin 2001; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) . More recently, Dyreng et al. (2010) find that individual executives have an incremental effect on their firms' tax avoidance that cannot be explained by firm characteristics. Their argument is that individual top executives are partially responsible for the variation in tax avoidance across firms, not necessarily through direct involvement in the tax function, but by setting the "tone at the top." Relatedly, Dyreng et al. (2012) finds that firms in more religious areas are less likely to use a tax shelter. Our study complements Dyreng et al. (2012) by undertaking a more comprehensive examination of the effects of religious social norms on tax avoidance by examining multiple measures of corporate tax avoidance and decomposing the religiosity measures into Protestant and Catholic components. We show that firms headquartered in more religious communities are less likely to avoid taxes. Thus, our results suggest that religiosity may explain the channel by which corporate executives exercise their incremental effect on tax avoidance. In addition, we examine how individual taxpayers' characteristics influence their tax reporting choices and find that religiosity is associated with lower tax avoidance by individual taxpayers.
Second, we contribute to the broader literature stream that suggests that religion-based social norms can serve as a mechanism for influencing corporate decision making (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2012; Grullon et al. 2010; Hilary and Hui 2009; McGuire et al. 2011) . Our study contributes to that literature by suggesting that religiosity can serve as a social mechanism for lowering corporate tax avoidance as well. Given the complexity of the current tax law, the sophistication of extant tax shelters, the decline in the IRS' enforcement activities, and the ubiquity and salience of tax avoidance (Slemrod 2007) , it is important to examine and document alternative mechanisms that can potentially contribute to greater tax compliance. Further, we decompose the religiosity measures into Protestant and Catholic components 6 and assess the effects of the two denominations on tax avoidance for both corporate and individual taxpayers. Notably, Shu et al. (2011) examine religious beliefs and mutual fund risk-taking behaviors, and suggest that Protestants are more risk averse than Catholics. However, as noted previously, although the first perspective on religiosity relates to risk aversion, there is also a second perspective which focuses on moral restraint, i.e., the role of religion in inhibiting unethical or opportunistic behavior. Consistent with the notion that Catholics tend to view taxes as a moral responsibility to support the poor (Curran 1985 ; USCatholic.org 2012), our findings broadly suggest that Catholics engage in less tax avoidance than Protestants.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the development of our Hypotheses, while sections 3 and 4 outline our sample, research design and empirical results for corporate and individual taxpayers, respectively. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Hypotheses Development
As evidence of the ubiquity and importance of tax avoidance in the US, Slemrod (2007) suggests that the overall avoidance rate for federal (corporate and individual) income taxes is about 17 percent with an annual tax gap (i.e., the difference between taxes owed and paid) in excess of $200 billion. By contrast, the IRS (2006) estimates the tax gap for tax year 2001 at $353 billion. Further, Slemrod (2007) notes that the Internal Revenue Services' (IRS) enforcement activities have declined sharply in recent years while the complexity of the tax law and the sophistication of tax shelters have grown, increasing the likelihood of tax avoidance. Collectively, these developments increase the relevance and importance of understanding tax avoidance by corporate and individual taxpayers.
Corporate tax avoidance
Prior research has identified several firm characteristics as being associated with variations in lower effective tax rates (ETRs) as a measure of tax avoidance across firms. These characteristics include firm size, profitability, leverage, capital intensity, and foreign operations (Gupta and Newberry 1997; Porcano 1986; Rego 2003; Shevlin and Porter 1992; Stickney and McGee 1982; Zimmerman 1983 ).
More recently, companies accused of tax sheltering have been found to be more profitable, to report larger book-tax differences, have higher R&D spending and less leverage, and to operate subsidiaries in foreign tax havens (Graham and Tucker 2006; Lisowsky 2010; Wilson 2009 ). Further, ownership structure (family ownership and dual class share structure) appears to be related to tax avoidance behavior (Chen et al. 2010; McGuire et al. 2012) . However, private equity ownership appears to be related to an increase in tax avoidance in the firms they invest (Badertscher et al. 2011 ).
Separately, Slemrod (2004) suggests that risk-neutral shareholders presumably expect managers to act on their behalf and utilize all available opportunities (subject to cost-benefit considerations) to minimize corporate tax liabilities. Indeed, given that the income tax represents a significant cost of doing business (potentially amounting to a third of pre-tax earnings), Weisbach (2002) refers to the undersheltering puzzle, i.e., why isn't there more corporate tax avoidance to benefit shareholders? However, placed in the context of the separation of ownership and control (agency problems), it is understandable that managers may be risk averse, i.e., have personal concerns about the probability of detection and punishment (penalties), leading to lower tax avoidance than otherwise. More recently, Dyreng et al. (2010) suggest that individual executives are an important determinant in their employers' tax avoidance, i.e., these managers have an incremental effect on tax avoidance that cannot be explained by firm characteristics.
One possible determinant of corporate tax avoidance that has been little explored in the prior literature involves managers and religiosity. However, the religiosity of corporate executives is neither public information nor directly observable. Indeed, it would be illegal for an employer or the IRS to inquire about the religious background of managers or other employees. Still, prior research suggests a positive relation between religiosity and the risk aversion of individuals. Thus, Miller and Hoffman (1995) report a negative association between religiosity and individuals' attitude to risk and danger. Also, Osoba (2003) provide evidence which suggests that church attendance is higher among risk-averse individuals. Similarly, Hilary and Hui (2009) indicate that individuals who attend religious services are less likely to accept riskier payouts and are also more risk averse. Further, they (Hilary and Hui 2009) indicate a link between religiosity at the county level and corporate behavior, i.e., firms domiciled in more 8 religious counties tend to be more risk averse as reflected in their corporate culture and behavior. In other words, they suggest that managers of firms headquartered in areas in which the population is more religious tend to be more risk averse. Thus, as noted previously, because tax avoidance is risky (i.e., involves tax positions that are less likely to be sustained upon audit and can expose the firm to legal penalties and loss of reputation), we argue that religiosity is related to lower tax avoidance.
Consistent with prior research (Hilary and Hui 2009; Kumar et al. 2011) , we assume that religiosity at the local (county) level influences local cultural values and norms and consequently affects the tax avoidance of managers residing in that county, even if they are not personally religious. After all, corporate decisions are not made by companies but by their executives, and these executives' decisions at work are likely influenced by what they do in the outside social and cultural environment (Hilary and Hui 2009 ). Consequently, religiosity at the community level may be expected to influence corporate tax avoidance.
From a different (i.e., non-risk aversion) perspective, Anderson (1988) suggests that Adam Smith (of Wealth of Nations fame) viewed religion as a type of internal moral enforcement mechanism. From this perspective, religion is a social mechanism for internalizing beliefs that restrain unethical behavior (e.g., McGuire et al. 2012 ). This view is consistent with that of North (1991) who suggests that religious precepts reinforce local cultural traditions in limiting opportunism in economic and social interactions.
In sum, given the role of religiosity in increasing risk aversion and in inhibiting unethical or opportunistic behavior, we predict that religiosity has a restraining influence on corporate tax avoidance.
Our first Hypothesis (for corporate taxpayers), stated in the alternate form, is as follows: H1: For corporate taxpayers, there is negative relation between the religiosity of the county in which the firm is headquartered and tax avoidance.
Individual tax avoidance
An essential difference between individual and corporate tax avoidance is the absence of agency problems, i.e., the lack of separation of ownership and control as an issue. Consequently, individual tax avoidance decisions are likely to reflect solely the private interests of the individual 9 taxpayer. The prior literature (e.g., Fischer et al. 1992; Jackson and Milliron 1986; Slemrod 1992) suggests that individual avoidance is determined by marginal tax rates, audit rates (i.e., the likelihood of detection), and penalty rates. However, given the low frequency of IRS audits, Alm (1991) suggests that financial self-interests alone cannot totally describe individual tax compliance because avoidance is likely to be far higher if detection and punishment were the only influencing factors.
3
In this section, we address the role of religiosity in explaining the variation in individual tax avoidance. Once again, the religiosity of individual taxpayers is not public information and it would be illegal for the IRS to inquire about the religious background of individual taxpayers. Still, the arguments for predicting that religiosity is related to lower tax avoidance for individual tax payers are broadly similar to the arguments discussed previously for corporate taxpayers. First, previous research suggests a positive relation between religiosity and risk aversion (Hilary and Hui 2009; Miller and Hoffman 1995; Osoba 2003) . Given that tax avoidance is potentially risky (because of the risk of being audited, exposure to legal penalties and possible loss of reputation), and the relation between religiosity and risk aversion, we argue that religiosity is related to lower tax avoidance. Second, religion is a social mechanism for influencing conduct in economic and social interactions (Kennedy and Lawton 1998; North 1991; Stulz and Williamson 2003) . Thus, religiosity can be expected to deter unethical behavior, i.e., the negative feelings associated with violating religion-based social norms may serve as a stronger deterrent than the perceived threat of legal sanctions (Grasmick and Bursick 1990) . Hence, consistent with prior research (Hilary and Hui 2009; Kumar et al. 2011) we assume that individuals internalize the norms of the community is which they reside and act in-line with local values, i.e., that religiosity at the local (county) level influences local cultural values and norms and consequently affects the tax avoidance decisions of individuals residing in that county, even if they are not personally religious. In other words, community religious norms may be expected to influence personal decision making including tax avoidance.
Our second Hypothesis (for individual taxpayers), stated in the alternate form, is as follows: 10 H2: For individual taxpayers, there is negative relation between tax avoidance and the religiosity of the county in which the individual taxpayer is located.
Corporate Tax Avoidance Tests
In this section, we discuss our hypothesis H1 concerning the impact of religiosity on corporate tax avoidance.
Empirical Model
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following pooled cross-sectional regression equation using ordinary least squares (OLS):
where TaxAv is a proxy for tax avoidance, RELIG is a proxy for the religiosity of the county where the firm's headquarters is located, CNT denotes a set of j firm-level control variables that have been shown in the prior literature (e.g., Mills 1998; Manzon and Plesko 2002; Rego 2003; Dyreng et al. 2008; Frank et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2010) to be correlated with tax avoidance, and DEMO denotes a set of demographic characteristics of the county where a firm's headquarters is located. The definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. All regressions include industry (Fama-French 48 industry classification) fixed effects and are estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors which are clustered by firm and year. Reported results are based on all observations, and untabulated results do not alter our inferences when we estimate equation (1) by eliminating observations with a studentized residual greater than the absolute value of 3.
Dependent variables
The focus of our study is the relation between religiosity and a firm's tax avoidance. Following prior research, we use three separate proxies (measures) for tax avoidance to examine the robustness of the association with our test variable religiosity. Because each measure has its limitations, prior research does not rely on any one single measure of tax avoidance. We explain each of these measures in detail next.
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Our first measure of tax avoidance is the long-term average cash effective tax rate (CETR). It is based on the work of Dyreng et al. (2008) and is calculated as the sum of the taxes paid in cash over the current and preceding four years (Compustat TXPD) divided by pretax book income (Compustat PI) less special items (SPI) summed over the corresponding period. Higher values of cash effective tax rates reflect lower tax avoidance. 4 This measure reflects both temporary and permanent book-tax differences, and avoids tax accrual effects present in the current tax expense (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) . Moreover, it is not affected by changes in the firm's tax contingencies or cushion, and therefore, gives an accurate estimate of tax avoidance activities at the firm level (Dyreng et al. 2008 ). In addition, calculating effective tax rates over a five year window avoids year-to-year volatility in annual effective tax rates and identifies firms successful at avoiding taxes in the long run.
A limitation of the CETR pointed out by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) is that it does not distinguish between real activities that are tax-favored and other activities specifically undertaken to reduce taxes. Stated differently, effective tax rates capture a broad range of activities, many of which are not risky or unethical (e.g., tax avoidance by purchasing tax-exempt bonds). Our next two measures, adapted from Wilson (2009) and Rego and Wilson (2012) , are intended to capture risky tax positions.
Our second measure of tax avoidance is the propensity to engage in tax sheltering (SHELTER), computed by using the following model obtained from logit model estimates reported in Table 5 of Wilson (2009) where BTD measures a firm's book tax differences, LEV is long-term debt divided by total assets, SIZE is log of total assets, ROA is net income divided by total assets, FOREIGN_INCOME is an indicator 4 Because CETR is calculated using data from the current and preceding four fiscal years, there is likely to be some degree of across-time dependency in CETR by construction. Our research design explicitly controls for this feature by basing statistical inferences on standard errors that control for firm (and time) clustering. However, as yet another test, we repeat the analysis using only observations from every 5th year (i.e., 1992, 1997, etc.) . For these observations, there is no overlap in the data used to calculate CETR, and hence no across-time dependency in CETR.
The results (untabulated) were qualitatively unchanged.
variable equal to 1 for firms with foreign income, 0 otherwise, and RD is a firm's research and development expenses scaled by total assets. A higher value of SHELTER reflects a larger probability of engaging in tax sheltering. Because tax shelters are single-transaction activities, the SHELTER variable may not reflect the full extent of risky tax avoidance activities of the firm.
Our third measure of tax avoidance is a proxy for unrecognized tax benefits. Unrecognized tax benefits is an accrued balance sheet liability, recognized pursuant to FIN 48, depicting expected future assessments to be made by taxing authorities arising from aggressive tax positions taken in current and prior accounting periods. As Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, p. 143) note, "higher unrecognized tax benefits represent more uncertainty in the firm's tax positions and thus are likely indicative of the degree of uncertainty in a firm's tax avoidance." As an accounting accrual, unrecognized tax benefits are subject to management's judgment, and hence may be influenced by financial reporting incentives. Thus, unrecognized tax benefits represent a composite measure that reflects both tax avoidance and tax-based earnings management activity.
We calculate predicted unrecognized tax benefits (PRED_UTB) as the predicted value from the following equation (obtained from Where DISC_ACCR is a proxy for discretionary accruals calculated using performance adjusted modified
Jones (1991) model, FOR_SALE is the ratio of foreign sales to total sales, SGA is selling and general 13 administrative expenses, SALES_GR is annual growth rate in sales, and all other variables are as defined before. 6 A higher value of PRED_UTB reflects a greater level of tax avoidance.
Test variable
Our data on religiosity are obtained from the American Religion Data Archive ( 6 We obtain DISC_ACCR as the residual from the following cross-sectional regression estimated by two-digit SIC 
Company-level Control Variables
As noted in the previous section, we control for a set of variables that Chen et al. (2010) report as influencing a firm's tax avoidance activities. We control for firm profitability (ROA) and net operating loss carry forwards (NOL and DNOL) to control for firm's need to avoid income taxes. We also control for firm size (SIZE), income from foreign operations (FI), leverage (LEV), capital intensity (PPE and INTANG), growth opportunities (EQINC) because prior research suggests that economies of scale and firm complexity are associated with tax avoidance. In addition, we control for CEO risk incentives, measured as the ratio of equity-based compensation to total compensation (EQ_INCENT), because Rego and Wilson (2012) show that tax avoidance increases as the CEO is incentivized to take greater risk.
Demographic Control Variables
We also consider the five county-level demographic variables analyzed by Iannaccone (1998) as possible determinants of religious participation at the individual level: age, marital status, urban population, income, and education. These variables are intended to control for potential county-level omitted variables correlated with religiosity (our test variable). More specifically, we consider the median age of the population (AGE), the fraction of married people (MARRIED) in the county, the fraction of county population living in urban area (URBAN), the fraction of county population living in rural area (RURAL), median household income of the county (INCOME), and educational attainment cannot rule out the possibility that interpolation of RELIG may have (somehow) induced a spurious correlation with CETR and PRED_UTB.
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(EDUCATION) as defined by the fraction of people 25 years and above with at least one year of college.
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We also include the fraction of Federal Congressional districts within the state that are held by representatives with Republican party affiliation (POL_ORIENT) because Christensen and Dhaliwal (2011) find that political orientation is associated with tax avoidance.
Sample
The process for identifying our sample firms is summarized in [Insert Table 1] 12 Consistent with Loughran and Schultz (2005) , we define URBAN as 1 if the company headquarters is in one of the ten largest metropolitan areas of the United States, and 0 otherwise; and RURAL as 1 if the company headquarters is 100 miles or more from the center of a metropolitan area of one million or more people, and 0 otherwise. The mean firm in our sample is profitable (with an ROA of 9.18 percent) and moderately leveraged with a long-term debt to asset ratio of 0.170. Approximately 29 percent of the firm-years in our sample have tax
Empirical Results

Descriptive Statistics
NOLs from prior periods. The median value of foreign income (FI) for our sample firms is zero dollars, and the average firm in our sample has about 30.51% of its assets in property plant and equipment (PPE) and about 15.05% of its total assets are intangible assets (INTANG). The average firm in our sample has a log market value of equity of about 5.97, has a market-to-book ratio of 2.65, and paid its CEO equitybased compensation that constituted 41.34% of his/her total compensation. 14 Approximately 42% of our sample is headquartered in one of the ten largest metropolitan areas of the United States (mean value of URBAN 42.41%).
[Insert Table 2 ] Table 4 presents the results of estimating alternative specifications of equation (1) Table 4 are based on robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm-and year-level (Gow et al. 2010) .
Correlations
Pooled Regression Results
[Insert Table 4] The explanatory power of equation (1) are less likely to avoid taxes. These findings are consistent with our second perspective on religiosity linked to moral restraint (rather than the first perspective of religiosity linked to risk aversion), i.e., our findings are related to the notion --discussed by Curran (1985) and USCatholic.org (2012) --that Catholics tend to view taxes as a moral obligation in support of the poor and are thus less likely to engage in tax avoidance behavior relative to Protestants.
Individual Tax Avoidance Tests
In this section, we address our hypothesis H2, which tests the impact of religiosity on tax avoidance by individual taxpayers. Our approach is similar in spirit to that of Brown et al. (2006) , who compare state-wide measures of income reported by the Internal Revenue Service to that reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Sample
The process used to create the sample used in the test of individual tax compliance is summarized in It is important to acknowledge several important limitations associated with the merged ACS and IRS data. The first limitation relates to a difference between the IRS and the ACS in the reference period.
The ACS collects data throughout the year on an on-going, monthly basis and asks for a respondent's household income over the past 12 months (US Census Bureau 2009). Thus, the aggregate household income reported in the ACS file is an estimate taken from sampling done throughout the calendar year. In contrast, the IRS data includes summary totals for all individual income tax forms processed through
Cycle 39 (the 39th week in the IRS's processing year) which is in late September. The returns cover the tax filing units --the filer and spouse (if any), plus all exemptions represented on the forms. Returns processed after the Cycle 39 cutoff date are not included in the data. According to the IRS, the data usually contain about 95 to 98 percent of all returns filed during any particular tax year. Thus, the Cycle 39 cutoff will yield aggregate county-wide adjusted gross income numbers that understate the actual county-wide income. In turn, this will yield an upward bias in our measure of unreported income (discussed below).
The second limitation relates to differences in the definition of income between the two datasets.
As we describe in greater detail below, we base our analysis on county-wide aggregate adjusted gross income reported to the IRS as compared to county-wide aggregate household income reported in ACS.
These two definitions of income are different. Aggregate ACS household income includes all income (whether taxable or tax-exempt), whereas IRS adjusted gross income omits tax-exempt income and
21 Table 5 Panel A shows that our sample consists of data on 757 counties across the five year period ended in year 2009. Of these 757 counties, only 697 counties appear in all years of the sample. As a result, it is possible that across-time changes in the sample composition are driving our results. To eliminate this possibility, we repeated the Table 6 analyses using data on the 697 counties. Estimation results (not tabulated) were qualitatively unchanged from those reported in Table 6 .
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includes certain deductions (e.g., moving expenses) not offset against ACS gross income. We deal with this problem in two ways. First, our robustness tests include supplemental analysis intended to probe the sensitivity of our results to differences in gross income definitions. 22 Second, we also include an analysis of IRS versus ACS wages and salary income. The advantage of examining wages and salary income is that it appears to be defined basically the same between the IRS and ACS. Specifically, the census bureau says "Wage or salary income includes total money earnings received for work performed as an employee during the past 12 months. It includes wages, salary, Armed Forces pay, commissions, tips, piece-rate payments, and cash bonuses earned before deductions were made for taxes, bonds, pensions, union dues, etc." (US Census Bureau 2010, p. 79) .
The third limitation relates to differences in the covered population. The IRS data--an aggregation of income reported on filed tax returns--obviously exclude income earned by individuals who are not required to file a tax return. According to the IRS, "there are segments of the population that are not well represented by tax returns [because they have no tax filing obligation]; most notably, the elderly and the poor." As we describe below, we control for differences in the covered population by including in our regression model (discussed below) variables that measure the elderly and poor population within each county.
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We have no reason to suspect that the aforementioned data limitations will induce systematic measurement error in our underreported income proxies that would create a spurious correlation with our test variables. In other words, we expect the bias in our measure of unreported income to merely dilute 22 Specifically, we repeat the analysis on county-year observations where aggregate total household income is below the sample median. The assumption here is that the difference between the ACS versus IRS definitions of income should be minimal in lower income counties (since lower-income households are less likely to have tax-exempt income and deductions for adjusted gross income). Estimation results (not tabulated) were qualitatively unchanged from those reported in Table 6 . 23 It is conceivable that a population group with a common religiosity might readily participate in the census survey but avoid reporting to the IRS for reasons related to their group. For example, illegal immigrants are unlikely to report income to the IRS and they may share a systematic, common religiosity. Thus, immigration status (legal versus illegal) potentially could induce correlated omitted variable bias. To address this issue, we partitioned the data by eliminating counties whose population of foreign nationals (as a fraction of county-wide population) was above the sample median, and repeated the analysis. Estimation results (not tabulated) were qualitatively unchanged from those reported in Table 6 . 23 the power of our tests. However, it is important to acknowledge the limitations and to give due consideration to them when interpreting the test results.
Empirical Model
To test our hypothesis, we conduct the analysis at both the county-year level and the county-level.
Our county-year analysis is based on the following pooled cross-sectional regression equation estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS):
where TaxAv is a proxy for tax avoidance in county k, RELIG is our county-level test variable, and 
Dependent Variable
We develop two proxies for tax avoidance from the merged IRS and ACS data. Our first proxy for tax avoidance is the extent of adjusted gross income underreported from individual tax returns filed with the IRS from within the county (UNDERREPORTED1 
Test Variable
Once again, our test variable is the level of religiosity (RELIG) in the county, and is defined the same way as in the analysis of corporate tax avoidance. Specifically, we calculate RELIG as the fraction of the county population that claims affiliation with an organized religion (as reported by ARDA in its survey), and linearly interpolate the data to obtain the values for the years 2005-2009. We also decompose RELIG into PROTESTANT and CATHOLIC as done in the corporate analysis.
County-Level Control Variables
The control variables in equation (3) As noted earlier, these variables are included to control for the upward bias in the dependent variables that is likely correlated with the extent of the poor and the elderly in the county population. 
All of the variables (except
Empirical Results
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Correlations
Panel C of Table 5 presents correlations between pairs of the variables used in our empirical model (2). UNDERREPORTED1 and UNDERREPORTED2 are negatively correlated with the variable RELIG, suggesting that on an univariate basis, the higher the religiosity of the county in which the individual taxpayer is located, the lower the percentage of income that is underreported. There is a wide variation in the magnitude of the correlations among the demographic variables. For example, the correlation between the variables POOR and INCOME is -0.75. By contrast, the correlation between the variables EDUCATION and RURAL is -0.03. Finally, the correlations between test variable RELIG and the eight demographic variables range from -0.06 to 0.10. Comparable correlations for PROTESTANT and CATHOLIC range from -0.34 to 0.46. In general, collinearity is not likely to be a significant issue in the multiple regressions because the condition index of the data matrix was well below the threshold of 20
that Belsley et al. (1980) suggest as indicative of a multicollinearity problem. Table 6 reports the regression results of estimating equation (2) for each of the 3 dependent variables. We report two specifications for each dependent variable --one with RELIG as the test variable, and a second specification with PROTESTANT and CATHOLIC substituted in place of RELIG.
County-Year Regression Results
Panel A reports the estimates using county-year data, while Panel B reports estimates for equation (2) after collapsing county-year data into a single county-level observation through averaging. As noted earlier, statistical inferences for the county-year model are based on standard errors that control for county and year clustering, while statistical inferences for the county-level analysis are based on OLS standard errors. The regression results are similar between Panels A and B, so our discussion below should be interpreted as relating to both panels unless otherwise noted.
[Insert Table 6] The explanatory power of equation (2) 27 avoidance) is higher in counties that are urbanized, poorer, and more educated. The demographic variable INCOME loads with a negative and statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that underreported income is lower in more affluent counties. The remaining control variables generally are not consistently significant.
In specification (1), our test variable RELIG loads with a negative and statistically significant coefficient, which suggests that counties with a higher level of religiosity tend to have lower unreported income on the individual tax returns filed from within the county. In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the religiosity variable RELIG results in a decrease in underreported income of 0.89% at the aggregate county level. 26 The comparable values for underreported wages and salary income is 0.57%.
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In specification (2), the test variables PROTESTANT and CATHOLIC each load negative and significant. In all estimations reported in Table 6 , the coefficient on CATHOLIC is significantly larger (p < .01) in magnitude than PROTESTANT (untabulated). This is consistent with results obtained in the analysis of corporate tax avoidance that Catholics are less likely to engage in tax avoidance relative to Protestants.
Concluding Remarks
Tax avoidance represents risky behavior for both corporate managers and individual taxpayers, because if the IRS is successful in challenging an aggressive tax position there can be substantial costs to pay in the form of interest charges, legal penalties and loss of reputation (if the tax avoidance becomes publicly known). Prior research suggests that religiosity is positively correlated with the individual's aversion to risk (Malinowski 1925; Gaspar and Clore 1998; Hilary and Hui 2009; Miller and Hoffman 1995) . Previous research also suggests that religiosity can serve as a social mechanism for inhibiting 26 Calculated as the standard deviation of the religiosity variable of .1180 (reported in Panel B of Table 5 ) multiplied by the coefficient for the RELIG variable (DV=UNDERREPORTED1) from the country-year analysis in Table 6 Panel A of -0.075. 27 Calculated as the standard deviation of the religiosity variable of .1180 (reported in Panel B of Table 5 ) multiplied by the coefficient for the RELIG variable from the country-year analysis in Table 6 Panel A of -0.048 for DV=UNDERREPORTED2.
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unethical or opportunistic behavior (Kennedy and Lawton 1998; North 1991; Stulz and Williamson 2003) . Other evidence suggests that religiosity at the local (county) level influences local cultural values and norms and consequently affects the decisions of managers and other individuals residing in that county, even if they are not personally religious (Hilary and Hui 2009; Kumar et al. 2011) . Altogether,
given the role of religiosity in increasing risk aversion and in inhibiting unethical or opportunistic behavior, we predict that religiosity has a restraining influence on tax avoidance by corporate and individual taxpayers.
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Hilary and Hui 2009), we measure religiosity based on the fraction of the local population that claims affiliation with an organized religion in the county in which the firm is headquartered or where the individual taxpayer resides. Our results suggest that firms headquartered (as well as individual taxpayers residing) in more religious counties are associated with less aggressive (i.e., less risky) tax avoidance, whether measured by a firm's cash effective tax rates, tax shelter prediction scores or the estimated amount of unrecognized tax benefits. Our findings complement Dyreng et al. (2010) who show that executives have an incremental effect on corporate tax avoidance behavior that cannot be explained by firm characteristics, i.e., senior executives contribute to the variation in tax avoidance across firms, not necessarily by involving themselves in the tax function but by setting the "tone at the top." Further, our study complements Dyreng et al. (2012) by examining more comprehensively the effects of religiosity on tax avoidance by investigating multiple metrics of corporate tax avoidance. We also examine the relation between religiosity and tax avoidance by individuals, which is an important and under-researched area of the tax avoidance literature. Finally, we decompose the religiosity measures into Protestant and Catholic components. Our study suggests that religiosity may explain the channel by which corporate executives exercise the incremental effect on tax avoidance.
Altogether, our study contributes to the broader literature that suggests that religiosity influences , where TXPD is cash taxes paid, PI is pretax income, and SPI is special items. The higher the metric, the lower the tax avoidance.
Compustat
SHELTER
Log-odds of engaging in tax sheltering based on the model from Wilson (2009) Tax Avoidance   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23 
INCOME
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note:
In Panel C, correlations of 0.027, 0.032, and 0.042 are significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (n=3,700). 
Notes:
The dependent variables are UNDERREPORTED1 and UNDERREPORTED2. UNDERREPORTED1 is the fraction of adjusted gross income omitted from individual taxpayer returns filed within the county. UNDERREPORTED2 is the fraction of wage and salary income omitted from individual taxpayer returns filed within the county. The test variables are the rate of religious affiliation (RELIG), protestant affiliation (PROTESTANT), and Catholic affiliation (CATHOLIC). See Appendix for variable definitions.
